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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the grazing management systems in operation in communal areas 
of central Eastern Cape Province, South Africa, through two contrasting case studies 
from the region.  Considerable differences in current management systems are 
identified and are shown to depend primarily on the degree of control that can be 
exercised by communities over communal grazing resources.  This in turn can be 
related to the social and ecological heterogeneity that characterises the region and 
how this influences pressure on grazing resources at the local level.  On the basis of 
this study three broad levels of grazing management system are identified in these 
communal areas.  These are:  complete lack of management with grazing taking place 
in an ‘open-access’ manner; grazing being controlled on a community basis and 
grazing taking place on private land and being controlled entirely by the landowner.  
The arable land allocations are shown to be of fundamental importance in facilitating 
many aspects of these different management scenarios.  Understanding the variation 
in these systems from both a social and ecological perspective will be fundamental in 
challenging previous management paradigms, and facilitating the development of 
effective common property institutions for grazing management systems in communal 
areas of South Africa. 
 
KEY WORDS: South Africa, rangeland, livestock, common property regimes, 
grazing management.  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout the world, extensive livestock production from natural rangeland areas is 
an important livelihood strategy for many rural communities (e.g. Moorehead, 1989; 
Sellen, 2003).  Many of these communities are largely pastoral in nature with 
livestock herds ranging over extensive areas of common grazing land, often on a 
seasonal basis (Naimir-Fuller, 1999; Turner and Hiernaux, 2002).  The key feature 
connecting many of these systems is that rangeland used for grazing is held and 
administered as common land – a common property resource.  Both Berkes et al. 
(1989) and Ostrom et al. (1999) consider common property resources as those that 
share two important characteristics.  The first is that exclusion (or control of access) 
of users to these resources is problematic.  The second is that each user is capable of 
subtracting from the welfare of other users.  Thus, in a more simplistic way common 
property resources can be defined as “a class of resources for which exclusion is 
difficult and joint use involves subtractability” (Berkes and Farvar, 1989: 7).     
 
Inherent in this definition is the potential for the over-exploitation of these resources 
as epitomised by the ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario famously articulated by 
Hardin (1968).  However, substantial empirical and theoretical research undertaken 
since the publication of Hardin’s article suggests that this outcome constitutes just one 
of several alternative scenarios and thus should in no way be viewed as inevitable 
(Ostrom et al., 1999).  Rather, it has been demonstrated that in many parts of the 
world effective governance systems are in place, which allow common property 
resources to be utilised sustainably (e.g. Moorehead, 1989; Niamir-Fuller, 1998).  
Characterising these systems and the conditions that support or, indeed, erode them 
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has been the focus of considerable research attention in recent years.  Nevertheless, 
these systems continue to remain poorly understood in many areas.   
 
South Africa is one example of a country in which the management of grazing 
systems in communal areas has only just begun to be elucidated.  Here common 
grazing resources have been subject to considerable state interference in the way they 
are held and managed (De Wet, 1987; Yawitch, 1988) as they have in other parts of 
the world (Sneath, 1998; Woodhouse et al., 2000), but what is almost unique is the 
sheer scale and time period over which this has taken place.  The historical legacy of 
minority rule has given rise to a situation in which communal grazing of rangeland is 
almost exclusively confined to the former ‘bantustans’ or homeland regions of the 
country.  These areas, designated under colonial rule and formalised under apartheid, 
constitute just 13% of the total land in South Africa and were created as reserves in 
which the bulk of the black population was forced to reside (Yawitch, 1988).  Indeed, 
some 12.7 million people (32% of the national total) still live in these areas (Adams et 
al., 2000).  Management strategies in many of these former homelands are no longer 
informed by seasonal herding to the extent that they once were.  For example, until 
the early nineteenth century, the Xhosa in the Eastern Cape would maintain their 
livestock in the more productive valleys during the dry season, and herd them onto the 
poorer grasses of the open plains only when the new shoots appeared in the spring 
(Peires, 1982).  Such movements are no longer possible within the confines of a 
modern regulatory framework introduced under colonial rule and systematically 
imposed in most areas under apartheid (De Wet, 1987).  Thus, although state 
intervention in common property grazing systems is widespread in sub-Saharan 
Africa, what is unique in the South African situation is the extent to which it was 
imposed and, perhaps most importantly, the effect this has had on the way these 
systems are now held and managed.   
 
At present relatively little is known about the diversity of the livestock management 
regimes practised in these areas, due mainly to the dearth of research conducted 
during the apartheid era and an assumption that these systems are of a single, 
relatively uniform type (Cousins, 1996).  Indeed, until relatively recently, the general 
perception amongst policy makers within the country was of a very laissez-faire 
approach to grazing management in the communal areas characterised by 
indiscriminate grazing on an open-access basis (see for example Forbes and Trollope, 
1991).  The previous apartheid regime readily fostered such misconceptions by 
conveniently aligning its concept of communal grazing with the tragedy of the 
commons paradigm of Hardin (1968), in which over-exploitation of the commons is 
seen as an inevitable consequence of communal use.   
 
Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop (1975) were amongst the first to explicitly recognise the 
major failing of Hardin’s paradigm in its confusion of common property with open 
access.  Since this time there has been a gradual move away from the conventional 
stance and an increasing recognition of the ability of the commons to be managed 
sustainably on a communal basis as well as a formal articulation of the social 
environment necessary to facilitate this (Berkes et al. 1989).   Fundamental in this 
new thinking (the ‘new institutionalism’ as it has become known) has been the 
recognition of the need to distinguish between common property resources and the 
regimes under which they are held (Berkes and Farvar, 1989).  The latter are generally 
recognised to be divisible into four different property rights regimes, namely open-
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access, common (or communal) property, private property and state property (Berkes 
et al., 1989).  The first two are of particular importance in the context of this paper.   
 
The parameters that distinguish common property from open-access regimes have 
been concisely outlined by Bromley (1989).  In his definition a common property 
regime consists of a well-defined group of authorised users, a well-defined resource 
that the group manage and a set of institutional arrangements that define both of these.  
There are also rules of use for the resource in question.  Conversely, in open-access 
situations users have privilege with respect to the use of the resource as nobody has 
the legal right to exclude them.  However, they have no actual rights to the resource 
(Bromley, 1989).  These differing regimes have important implications for the 
management of communal grazing resources and their preservation in the longer term.  
In the common property situation the resource is managed on a consensus basis to the 
mutual benefit of the community and there is, therefore, an incentive to ensure its 
productivity in the long term.  Under open access however, grazing management 
decisions are essentially taken on an individual or ‘clique’ basis with the sole 
intention of maximising benefit to the individual and there is little or no incentive to 
manage the grazing resource productively and sustainably in the long term.  
 
Importantly, the democratic, post apartheid government of South Africa has also 
embraced the ‘new institutionalism’ thinking on common property regimes, notably in 
its White Paper on Land Policy (DLA, 1997).  However, the government’s almost 
wholesale acceptance of this new common property theory has been criticised by 
several commentators (e.g Ainslie, 1998b; Cousins, 2000) who feel that many of the 
premises upon which the theory rests are not fulfilled in South Africa.   In particular, 
the erosion of traditional institutions involved in land administration in the former 
homelands and excessive problems of landlessness and overcrowding in these areas 
resulting, has created a somewhat extreme social environment which might constrain 
how effectively the new theory can be applied (Ainslie, 1998b).  Indeed, it is apparent 
that in many areas of South Africa the management regimes currently in place are 
more akin to open-access than to what is formally recognised as common property 
(Cousins 1996, Ainslie, 1998b).  For this reason, it is inappropriate to attempt the 
wholesale application of existing common property theory to the South African 
scenario.  Rather, there are several critical issues to be addressed if common property 
institutional arrangements are to be effectively tailored to the contemporary 
conditions of extensive livestock production in South Africa (Cousins, 1995). 
 
Thus, a clearer understanding of how common property regimes function at an 
integrated level in South Africa is fundamental in developing an empirical basis to 
facilitate effective institutional capacity building at both the local and national level as 
well as other policy recommendations.  However, the social and ecological realities of 
these communal grazing systems remain poorly understood.  To this end, this paper 
aims to outline the diversity of grazing management regimes currently in operation in 
communal areas.  Based on a detailed study of two contrasting communities in central 
Eastern Cape Province, it explores the variation in the key characteristics that 
differentiate grazing management regimes in the region and interprets them in the 
context of local social and ecological factors and in terms of the broader debate on 
inequality associated with land ownership in Africa.   A generalised framework of 
current grazing management systems is developed and its applicability both at a 
national level and beyond is discussed.  Finally, the broader implications of the 
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research for institutional restructuring and agrarian reform as a whole in South Africa 
are also considered.   
 
 
Common property resources in central Eastern Cape Province 
 
This research was undertaken in the central region of Eastern Cape Province in what 
was formerly the homeland of Ciskei (Figure 1).  The region has a turbulent social 
and political history, which has had an important bearing on the governance of natural 
resources in the region and the evolution of the property regimes under which they are 
held.  Of particular significance has been the policies introduced since 1948, which 
were resonant with apartheid’s ultimate goal of separate development along racial 
lines.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of central Eastern Cape Province, South Africa. 
 
 
Betterment Planning 
 
Amongst the most important of these policies, with respect to local production 
systems, was ‘betterment planning’.  This was first introduced during the 1930s in 
response to government concerns that the homeland areas were becoming increasingly 
overcrowded and degraded and as such posed a potential threat to political stability 
(De Wet, 1987).  Subsequently, under apartheid, betterment became far more of a 
political tool functioning as a mechanism of social control over a growing black 
population (De Wet, 1987).  The imposition of betterment was particularly thorough 
in the former Ciskei, with nearly 80% of the communal areas subject to some level of 
betterment by the early 1970s (Trollope and Coetzee, 1975).   
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The betterment process was concerned primarily with improving land use and its most 
tangible manifestation was the division of existing community land into rangeland, 
arable land and residential land by the use of fencing (De Wet, 1987).  Concomitant 
with this change in land use was the introduction of a system of land management, 
which was frequently enforced by the state.  This was primarily oriented towards 
agriculture and included the restriction of crop production to designated areas of 
arable land and the active management of rangeland for livestock production.   The 
overall effect of this was to remove many of the key characteristics of the previous 
common property regimes under which agricultural resources were held.  The result 
was property regimes, which although communal in name were effectively state-
controlled.    
 
An important feature of rangeland management, introduced with betterment, was the 
rotational grazing of range camps.  This generally took the form of the one-herd-four-
camp system, whereby one grazing camp was rested for the entire year and the 
remaining three were grazed on a rotational basis (Forbes and Trollope, 1991).  This 
system was perpetuated under state control in the Ciskei until the early 1970s, when 
the South African Bantu Trust, responsible for its enforcement, was dissolved and 
control effectively devolved to individual communities (Forbes and Trollope, 1991).   
The other major land management exercise introduced with betterment was the 
opening of the arable land as an additional forage reserve for livestock during the 
winter.  This occurred only when harvesting was complete and was again enforced by 
the state.  The general way in which this system was intended to function under 
betterment is summarised in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: General paradigm for the use of arable land as a dry season forage 
reserve for livestock under betterment planning 
 
All fields become a communal 
grazing resource for village 
animals unless a winter crop 
has been planted 
First prolonged rains signal 
beginning of cropping season 
and all livestock are removed 
from arable lands 
All livestock excluded 
from arable lands and 
grazed on rangeland 
during cropping period 
Lands opened once all 
individuals have 
finished harvesting 
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As with rotational grazing, control over the management of arable grazing now rests 
with individual communities and the level of adherence to the original betterment 
system varies considerably.   
 
Thus, in the former homeland of Ciskei, the complicated system of land division and 
management associated with betterment planning, combined with the already diverse 
tenure arrangements governing the ownership of land, created a highly complex 
system of land rights and resource management.  A simplified representation of the 
way in which this system functioned in many communities is summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Land rights and use associated with different land types and times of 
the year in communal areas of the former Ciskei. 
 
RESIDENTIAL 
LAND 
ARABLE LAND ALLOCATIONS RANGELAND 
Wet Season Dry Season 
Land consisting of 
building lot and/or 
home garden and 
held under a variety 
of individual tenure 
types with varying 
degrees of security:  
 
Freehold 
Quitrent 
Communal 
Trust  
 
Individual rights 
over fields are 
maintained with 
the same tenure 
system as 
residential plot and 
the field may be 
used to produce a 
summer crop. 
 
Livestock are 
excluded from the 
area at this time. 
Individual rights 
over fields are 
relinquished as the 
arable lands 
become a common 
property grazing 
resource for 
livestock. 
 
Individual rights 
can be maintained 
in circumstances 
where a winter 
crop is produced. 
Rangeland used for 
grazing community 
livestock 
throughout the year 
as part of a common 
property regime. 
 
Management 
involves resting of 
one camp and 
rotational grazing of 
the remainder.  
 
Of particular importance to this discussion is the way in which land rights and use 
associated with grazing land have changed in the former Ciskei, since the enforcement 
of this complex system broke down during the 1970s.  Elaborating these changes is 
crucial in identifying how they have affected the common property grazing regimes 
associated with these grazing areas.   
 
Forced resettlement 
 
Other examples of government-imposed social engineering in the region, include the 
resettlement of people forcibly removed from ‘white’ South Africa (RSA) during the 
apartheid era.  These ‘forced removals’ began during the 1950s and continued right 
into the 1980s in an attempt to realise the separate development goals of apartheid.  
There was a considerable amount of resettlement in the former Ciskei.  However, the 
redistribution of individuals was far from uniform.  Some districts received a large 
number of social refugees whereas, in a distinctly political move, other more favoured 
districts within the Ciskei received few or none of these displaced people (Switzer, 
1993).  As a consequence the region is now characterised by wide variation in 
population pressure over relatively short distances.   This is conjectured to have had a 
significant impact on the functioning of common property regimes in the region.  
Maintenance of defined user groups is notoriously difficult when communities are 
S
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swollen by immigrants with no official land rights.  Under these circumstances 
common property regimes have the potential to rapidly degenerate into open access 
(Lawry, 1990).   
 
Ecological variation in range productivity 
 
This social heterogeneity is further compounded by a third factor of considerable 
importance: the ecology of the natural rangeland in terms of its variable productivity 
and response to grazing pressure.  There are two important aspects of this, which have 
implications for rangeland management strategies in these communal areas.  The first 
is rooted in the considerable debate that has developed in recent years concerning the 
degree of feedback between livestock and vegetation in rangeland systems.  Recent 
interpretations of African grazing systems as largely non-equilibrial in character 
suggest that feedback between livestock and vegetation is absent or at least severely 
attenuated for much of the time (Ellis and Swift, 1988; Behnke and Scoones, 1993; 
Niamir-Fuller, 1998).  However, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that 
many South African grazing systems exhibit characteristics of a mostly equilibrial 
nature, particularly during drought episodes (Scogings et al., 1999; Fynn and 
O’Connor, 2000).  Certainly, the grazing systems of central Eastern Cape appear to be 
inherently equilibrial in nature (Scogings et al., 1999).  This has important 
implications for rangeland systems in the region, as it implies that they will respond to 
livestock grazing pressure and therefore the timing and intensity of grazing requires 
management to avoid resource degradation.   
 
The other important ecological factor is the natural variation in the productivity of 
these rangelands in terms of their classification as sweetveld, sourveld or mixed veld 
(a mixture of sweet and sourveld in varying proportions).  This South African 
classification system is based on the seasonal variation in productivity of the bush and 
grass species that constitute these different rangeland types (Huntley, 1982).  
Sweetveld is distinguished from sourveld in that it remains relatively nutritious in the 
dry season and enables livestock to maintain condition at this time, whereas sourveld 
declines in quality during the dry season to the extent that livestock frequently lose 
condition (Tainton, 1999).  This difference in productivity is a function primarily of 
soil nutrient availability and rainfall (Bell, 1982).  In general sweetveld is associated 
with areas of relatively high soil nutrient availability and low to medium rainfall.  
Importantly, is also characterised by having an inherent ‘resilience’, which manifests 
itself in the fact that even under conditions of high grazing pressure and substantial 
vegetation change (such as in a communal grazing system) good rainfall will allow 
the system to recover rapidly to an equilibrium state (Walker, 1980).  In contrast 
sourveld tends to be associated with moist and mesic rangeland areas and low soil 
nutrient availability.  It has a relatively poor level of resilience in the face of high 
pressure grazing and as a consequence is vulnerable to declines in productivity under 
adverse conditions of grazing or drought.   
 
These ecological differences have important implications for livestock management in 
communal areas.  They suggest that whilst feedback between plants and animals is 
apparent in both rangeland types, the degree to which this is buffered by physical 
factors such as soil fertility and rainfall differs quite markedly.  Sweetveld areas are 
less vulnerable in the longer term to the ecological degradation resulting from high 
grazing pressure and low levels of management (characteristic of an open-access 
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grazing regime), due to their ability to recover rapidly under conditions of good 
rainfall.  In contrast in sourveld areas such resilience is absent, and some level of 
management of both livestock numbers and timing of access to key grazing resources 
is therefore essential to prevent rangeland degradation in the long term.   
 
In summary therefore, these historical social-political and ecological factors interact 
to create a highly diverse environment at the local level with regard to population 
pressure, type and quality of forage, the availability and management of rangeland 
and the effectiveness of local common property institutions.  Specific aspects of the 
social and ecological heterogeneity of each case village will now be elaborated.   
 
 
The case study villages 
 
Research was undertaken at two villages in central Eastern Cape Province, Guquka 
and Koloni.  These were selected because they were known to be representative of a 
wide range of both the social and ecological conditions that characterise the region.   
 
Guquka 
 
Guquka, is located in Victoria East District in the foothills of the Amatola Mountains.  
It is part of a group of villages that formerly constituted the AmaKhuze Tribal 
Authority, established during the mid to late 19th century (Van Averbeke et al, 1998).  
The arable land is some 150 ha in extent and divided into 41 separate fields.  These 
fields and the original residential plots associated with them are held under quitrent 
title, a form of individual tenure granted by the colonial government from the middle 
of the nineteenth century onwards (Cokwana, 1988).  The area was subject to limited 
betterment planning during the 1960s, to the extent that rangeland and arable land was 
fenced off from the residential section of the village (Figure 3).  Importantly, during 
this time the additional residential sites that had appeared with the natural growth of 
the village as well as an influx of displaced people, were formalised under Permission 
to Occupy (PTO), which is a form of communal tenure (Cokwana, 1988).  Thus, a 
two-tier system of land rights now exists at the village involving a ‘landed’ minority 
with individual title to arable land and ‘landless’ majority with only communal land 
rights.  The range area is shared with two neighbouring communities: the village of 
Gilton and the adjacent township of Kayalethu.  Gilton was established at the same 
time as Guquka and access to rangeland has historically been shared between them.   
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Figure 3: Land use patterns at Guquka village. 
 
 
Kayalethu is a far more recent settlement being founded during the late 1950s as a 
repository for black people displaced from the RSA as part of the forced removals 
programme (Cook, 1980).  This had the effect of greatly swelling the local population 
at this time and putting considerable pressure on the already limited grazing resources 
in the area.  This pressure was further exacerbated by the loss, during the 1970s, of 
much of the available mountain pastures, which were converted into pine plantations 
by the Ciskei Forestry Department (Van Averbeke et al., 1998).  In response to this 
increased pressure on resources many landowners took it upon themselves to fence 
their arable fields individually to ensure livestock could not damage crops during the 
growing season.  The majority of this individual fencing is still maintained by field 
owners (Bennett, 2002).  Allocation and management of natural resources is officially 
under the jurisdiction of the democratically elected Resident’s Association (RA).  
However, at a practical level it appears that control over management of grazing 
resources rests with a somewhat ad hoc grazing committee, constituted by key 
livestock owners (Holbrook, 1998).  This committee is essentially a vestige of the old 
Tribal Authority System and underlines the failure of the current democratic system to 
entirely supplant pre-existing institutions involved in land management in the region 
(Ainslie, 1998a).  The local rangeland type is classified as Döhne and Highland 
Sourveld (Acocks, 1988) and becomes nutritionally poor during the dry season.   
 
Koloni 
 
Koloni, the second study village, is one of several villages that compose the 
AmaGqunukwebe Tribal Authority located in Middledrift District (Figure 4).  The 
rangeland amounts to 650 ha and belongs exclusively to the village.  The arable land 
allocation constitutes an additional 400 ha of land and is divided into separate fields 
each of 3 morgen (approximately 2.57ha) in size.  The allocation of these fields and 
the associated residential plots took place from 1876 onwards under quitrent tenure.  
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Koloni has experienced little growth beyond these original site allocations.  Some 
additional residential site allocations under PTO did take place from the mid 1980s 
onwards but these have been limited.  Thus, unlike Guquka landed individuals with 
secure tenure are very much in the majority at the village.  The village was a pioneer 
site for betterment, being planned in the late 1930s and extensively improved during 
the early 1960s.  This involved the use of fencing to separate the range and arable 
lands from the residential area, the division of the range into four separate camps, the 
construction of stock dams and the widespread introduction of contour banks on the 
arable lands to help stem erosion (Bantu Affairs Commission, 1962).  A rotational 
system of grazing management was introduced and enforced at this time and this is 
still perpetuated to a limited extent (Goqwana and Scogings, 1997).   
 
 
 
Figure 4: Land use patterns at Koloni village. 
 
As with Guquka, control of grazing management lies with the Resident’s Association 
(RA), which is effectively comprised of all the adult village residents and headed by a 
democratically elected chairman (Van Averbeke et al, 1998).  However, there do not 
appear to be any other, informal institutions involved in resource management.  The 
local rangeland type is classified as False Thornveld of the Eastern Cape (Acocks, 
1988).  This is a type of sweetveld, which remains nutritious as the grass sward 
matures, maintaining livestock productivity throughout the dry season.       
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METHOD 
 
Field data collection 
 
Information regarding grazing management was collected through a series of 
interviews.  Interview work was undertaken between November 1997 and April 1999.  
Interviews were conducted at both research villages in two stages.  Firstly, there was a 
series of largely qualitative, semi-structured interviews with individual livestock 
owners (Robson, 1993).  The aim of these interviews was to generate data on exactly 
how people at each village managed their livestock on a day-to-day basis, particularly 
during the dry season when the arable land allocations became available for grazing.  
Individuals were selected from those who owned livestock.  These were then divided 
into those who had access to arable land and those who did not and further stratified 
on the basis of gender to give four social groupings as depicted by the shaded area in 
Figure 5.   
 
 
Figure 5: Sample from which interviewees were selected (shaded area) 
 
In each village a 50% sample of each of the four sample groupings was randomly 
selected for interview.  Finally, on the basis of these interviews, detailed case study 
interviews were subsequently undertaken with individuals whose grazing 
management practices differed significantly from the theoretical framework outlined 
earlier (Figure 2).  These interviews were undertaken in April 1999, and were largely 
unstructured and qualitative (Yin, 1989; Robson, 1993). 
 
 
RESULTS: GRAZING MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE 
 
The research suggests that grazing is still subject to some form of management at both 
villages.   However, there are major differences in the way this is implemented at the 
villages.   
 
Rangeland grazing 
 
At Guquka, the rangeland area is available to all livestock species at all times of the 
year.  Moreover, it is utilised not only by livestock from Guquka but also by those 
from the neighbouring settlements of Gilton and Kayalethu.  All that remains of the 
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fencing introduced under betterment is that which defines the upper limit of the range.  
Thus, it is no longer possible to practice any form of rotational grazing on the 
available range area.  Indeed, with the demise of the rangers who used to enforce local 
grazing management decisions, there is no longer any form of co-ordinated rangeland 
management between the three communities involved (Van Averbeke et al., 1998).  
Furthermore, there does not even appear to be any form of central control over 
rangeland grazing at the individual community level.  At Guquka control of rangeland 
grazing is entirely under the jurisdiction of individual livestock owners with regard to 
timing, duration and the extent to which the animals are allowed to free-range.  For 
reasons of safety small-stock from Guquka tend to be grazed in relative proximity to 
the village.  Cattle, however, can be found grazing throughout the area, including the 
most mountainous extent of the range during the summer months.  Cattle even gain 
access to the state forest plantations where fencing is inadequate.  This leaves them 
vulnerable to impoundment and theft, the latter having become a significant problem 
in recent years.  Seasonal parameters have an important role to play in the utilisation 
of the mountain pastures.  With the approach of the dry season, cattle move down to 
the lower areas of the range and do not return to the higher pastures until springtime.  
However, these management decisions are driven largely by the desire of the animals 
themselves as well as that of individual owners and are not under any form of 
communal jurisdiction.  Thus, there is no longer any formal, community control over 
the management of rangeland resources at Guquka and the surrounding area.  In 
essence an open-access situation has developed in which there is mutual privilege 
with respect to the rangeland for all livestock owners but no formal grazing rights 
(Bromley, 1989).  
 
At Koloni, extensive control of rangeland grazing is possible because fencing divides 
the range area into four separate camps and, importantly, this area belongs exclusively 
to Koloni.  Under the original village betterment plan, drawn up in 1961, it was 
envisaged that one grazing camp would be rested for a period of a year whilst the 
remainder were grazed on a rotational basis (Bantu Affairs Commission, 1962).  This 
involved a notice being issued from the Bantu Affairs Office at the beginning of each 
year as to which camp was to be rested.  Indeed, rotational resting of the camps is still 
practised, although it is unclear whether the camp is now rested for the entire year in 
all cases or whether the original resting regime is still adhered to.  Furthermore, it 
would appear that the rested camp functions as a sanctuary for elderly or sick animals, 
particularly during the winter.  What is clear is that rotational grazing of the camps is 
no longer practised.  Rather, the three camps that are not being rested are grazed 
simultaneously (Goqwana and Scogings, 1997).  This appears to be a practical 
response to the logistical problem of many livestock owners being located a 
considerable distance from some of the camps due to the configuration of the village 
after betterment.  Owners now simply make use of whichever of the three camps is 
nearest to them.  Thus, the current scenario involves resting of camps between years 
(every four years) but no longer within years. 
 
The separation of the range into camps also allows the RA to control the type of 
animals involved in grazing.  During the summer this is of no importance, because 
mixed grazing is practised on all three grazed camps.  However, during the winter 
months the arable land allocations at Koloni are reserved as a grazing resource for 
cattle alone (see below).  This is possible, because all small-stock are maintained 
within selected range camps at this time. 
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Grazing of the arable land allocations 
 
Grazing of the arable land allocations at Koloni is controlled through a clearly defined 
common property regime from the moment they become available to livestock.  The 
user group includes all those who belong to the Resident’s Association (RA), which 
effectively includes all the adults resident at Koloni.  Likewise, at Guquka, 
management of the arable land allocations is still under some semblance of communal 
control (unlike the open-access situation that predominates on the formal rangeland 
area).  There are several key features of the control of arable grazing at both villages, 
which are discussed in turn below. 
 
 
Initiation of arable grazing. 
 
One key aspect of this grazing management concerns the point at which the arable 
land allocations are made available to grazing.  According to the standard betterment 
model, the arable land allocations are opened to grazing once the harvesting of all 
crops has been completed (Figure 2).   
 
At both villages a meeting of the Resident’s Association is held, which all individuals 
who own cattle or have access to a field all field are encouraged to attend, and a 
decision to formally open the arable fields to grazing is taken once there is agreement 
amongst participants.  At Koloni, every individual who has grown a crop must have 
finished reaping before the lands are opened.  However, at Guquka this decision 
appears to be interpreted more flexibly.  Not everybody finishes harvesting at the 
same time, and so the grazing of crop residues is frequently initiated before all 
harvesting is completed.  In such instances, livestock owners make an arrangement to 
put their animals on one field after another in a staggered manner.  The process is 
continued until harvesting is completed on all fields and it is only at this point that the 
entire arable allocation is opened to grazing.  This can be viewed as a practical means 
of supplying hungry livestock with forage at a critical time of the year as well as 
preventing trespassing cattle from Kayalethu from gaining access to these vital crop 
residues.  In both cases is made possible by crop production at Guquka taking place 
almost exclusively in fenced fields. 
 
With regard to the closing of the lands a number of human and climatic factors 
influence the decision.  In the late dry season individuals begin to prepare for the next 
season of cropping.  The desire of individuals to begin cultivating, combined with the 
state of the range camps, determines the exact timing of the closure.  The single most 
important factor in this decision is the coming of the summer rains as this 
simultaneously heralds both the time of planting and the recovery of the range camps.  
After the first period of prolonged rain a meeting of the RA is held in which the 
closure of the arable lands will be discussed.  Given sufficient agreement amongst 
those owning livestock and those wishing to cultivate, the motion will be carried and 
the lands officially closed.   At this point, livestock owners are obliged to remove all 
their animals to the appropriate range camps.   
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Livestock involved in arable grazing. 
 
As well as the timing of arable grazing, the grazing management system at each 
village also controls the type of livestock allowed on the arable lands.  At Koloni it is 
clear that the arable land allocations are reserved exclusively for cattle.  This is 
because they are perceived as being the most valuable of the livestock species 
(culturally and economically) and at greatest risk from lack of forage during the dry 
season.  All small-stock are restricted to the range camps at this time and the few that 
gain access to the arable lands do so as a result of inadequate perimeter fencing.  In 
contrast at Guquka, grazing of the arable land allocations takes place on a mixed basis 
during the dry season, involving sheep and goats as well as cattle.  This is actually a 
recommended grazing practice at a commercial level as large-stock and small-stock 
feed on different types of forage and their feeding patterns complement each other.  
Grazing them on a mixed basis thus facilitates the most effective utilisation of the 
available forage resources (Gertenbach et al., 1998).  
 
Grazing of arable fields at other times of the year. 
 
There are also regulations governing the grazing of arable land allocations outside the 
dry season.  At Koloni there is strict adherence to the general betterment model set out 
in Figure 2 in this respect, as once the fields have officially been closed to grazing no 
livestock are allowed on the arable land allocations.  The only exception tolerated is 
oxen involved in crop production.  For pragmatic reasons these tend to be maintained 
on the arable lands by their owners during the time of ploughing but are immediately 
removed once ploughing is complete.  At Guquka however, it is clear that there is a 
marked deviation from the betterment model with the arable fields being grazed by 
livestock both from within the village and outside throughout the course of the 
cropping period.  Lack of available grazing at Kayalethu encourages livestock owners 
from this settlement to maintain their animals on Guquka’s arable lands.  This appears 
to be an ongoing source of contention, as during dry season 1999 several key 
livestock owners from Guquka were observed repairing sections of the perimeter 
fence, where the majority of livestock gained access.  This proved successful in the 
short term but within a few weeks the problem returned following deliberate cutting 
of the fence (Bennett, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, livestock from Guquka itself also make significant use of the fields for 
grazing at this time.  This mostly takes the form of cattle grazing individually fenced 
fields either because owners are absent from the village (i.e. the field is uncultivated) 
or because animals are sick or unruly.  Another powerful incentive for owners to 
restrict livestock to fenced fields at this time is stock theft.  Cattle in particular have a 
tendency to wander over considerable distances when given access to the mountain 
pastures during the summer, which makes them vulnerable to theft.  Thus, restricting 
cattle to fenced fields allows them to be retained in relatively close proximity to the 
homestead.  However, access by livestock from Guquka to the arable lands during the 
cropping season is not just restricted to private grazing.  Towards the end of the 
cropping period, increasing numbers of cattle from Guquka can be found free-ranging 
on unfenced areas of the arable lands.  Owners generally justify this behaviour to the 
grazing committee with an official excuse, but the underlying reason for their 
presence is invariably shortage of forage on the range area at this time.  Moreover, the 
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owners who are able to engage in this practice tend to be those who are well 
connected with the grazing committee on the basis of social standing.   
 
Maintenance of individual rights over fields. 
 
Finally, there is also the issue of maintenance of individual rights over fields during 
the dry season.  Conventional wisdom holds that all fields should be accessible by all 
livestock at this time, unless a winter crop is grown (Figure 2).  Every field must be 
made available for grazing, even those that are fenced.  At Koloni this basic protocol 
is strictly adhered to with all fields being made available to livestock (cattle) unless a 
dry season crop is grown.  Thus, during most dry seasons, there are few restrictions on 
cattle movements over the arable fields at Koloni from a land rights perspective.  At 
Guquka, however, several residents maintain individual rights over fields throughout 
the winter without growing crops.  This may be for grazing their own livestock or 
simply for resting a field that was grazed during the summer months.  In all cases 
these exceptions are possible because the field is fenced.   
 
 
Summary of findings 
 
Thus, there are in practice marked differences in the grazing management frameworks 
in operation at each village.  The key differences are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Key differences in grazing management practices at Guquka and 
Koloni. 
 
Practice Guquka Koloni 
 
 
Rangeland grazing 
No communal control over 
grazing of livestock on 
rangeland due to inadequate 
boundary definition and 
ineffective co-ordination 
between multiple user 
groups. 
Strong definition of rangeland 
boundaries and separation into 
grazing camps through fencing 
facilitates both rotational resting, 
the separation of cattle from 
small-stock in the dry season and 
exclusive control over rangeland 
grazing by the community.  
Initiation of arable 
grazing 
Grazing of crop residues 
often undertaken before all 
harvesting is complete. 
Grazing of arable lands only 
initiated once harvesting is 
complete. 
Livestock involved 
in arable grazing 
Open to all livestock Limited to cattle 
 
Grazing of arable 
fields at other 
times of the year 
Arable fields grazed during 
cropping period both by 
trespassing cattle from 
Kayalethu and cattle from 
Guquka 
Grazing of arable lands strictly 
prohibited during cropping 
period except by cattle involved 
in ploughing. 
 
Maintenance of 
individual rights 
over fields 
Owners may chose to 
exercise exclusive grazing 
rights over their arable 
field(s) even if they have 
not grown a forage crop. 
Owners may only chose to 
exercise exclusive grazing rights 
over their arable field(s) if they 
have grown a forage crop. 
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The most important of these differences between the villages in terms of their 
implications for common property institutions in the region are the level of communal 
control over both rangeland and arable land grazing, and the maintenance of 
individual grazing rights over arable fields.  These will now be explored in more 
detail. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The key differences between the grazing management systems at Guquka and Koloni 
are essentially a result of differing levels of resource demand, availability and control 
at each village.   
        
At Koloni local grazing pressure is relatively low and grazing resources are 
considerable, of good quality and belong exclusively to the village.  Moreover, the 
separation of arable land from grazing land and the division of the range into camps 
by fencing allows flexibility in control over grazing decisions at the communal level.  
The quality of the grazing resource at the village has been corroborated by range 
condition assessments conducted during the late 1990s (ARDRI, 1996; Goqwana, 
1998).   
 
The extensive grazing resources at Koloni are unusual in most communal areas of the 
former Ciskei and are a direct result of the village being a pioneer site for betterment 
planning in the late 1930s.  The government planners, keen to make betterment a 
success in these pioneer villages, gave them generous allocations of land and other 
resources (Ndlovu, 1991).  In this environment of relative plenty, the RA at Koloni is 
able to both make and enforce a series of quite complex land rights and management 
rules associated with the grazing of both the formal rangeland and arable land 
allocations as part of an effective common property regime.   Much of this has been 
derived from the old betterment model, as outlined in Table 1 and Figure 2, although 
there have been some notable adaptations.  Some, such as the cessation of rotational 
grazing have been essentially pragmatic.  However, perhaps the most important 
development from a common property perspective is that the key grazing 
management decisions are no longer imposed by state officials as they were under the 
Bantu Trust but rather are decided democratically by the community as a whole.  In 
this sense the management system now has a vital element of inclusiveness and 
community ownership, which was previously lacking.  Thus, the current system can 
be viewed as a modern and flexible interpretation of the original betterment grazing 
model.  Indeed, in its new guise the grazing management model at Koloni fulfils the 
generally acknowledged criteria for a common property regime in that it consists of a 
well-defined group of authorised users, has a clearly defined grazing resource that the 
group manages, a set of rules for the use of the resource and a set of institutional 
arrangements to oversee these (Ostrom, 1990, cited in Cousins, 1995).  
 
In contrast, the situation at Guquka is very different.  The formal rangeland is shared 
with several other communities and is essentially inadequate for the number of 
livestock it serves both in terms of the amount of forage available and its nutritional 
quality as sourveld.  This latter factor becomes particularly problematic during the dry 
season when livestock begin to lose condition without supplementation.  Furthermore, 
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although access to the arable land allocations is officially restricted to residents of 
Guquka, inadequate perimeter fencing combined with intense demand for grazing 
resources makes it difficult to retain arable grazing rights exclusively for the village.   
 
Indeed, a two-tier system of individual control over grazing resources appears to be in 
operation at Guquka.  These two levels represent the opposite ends of the spectrum of 
grazing management and neither fulfils the criteria for a recognised common property 
regime (Bromley, 1989).  At one extreme is the essentially open-access system in 
operation on the formal rangeland area.  Here the rangeland is shared by several 
neighbouring communities and grazing management is impossible at a communal 
level as the user group is essentially too large and inadequately defined.  There are 
also no defined rules for resource use or the necessary institutional arrangements to 
oversee them.  A “free-for-all” scenario has therefore developed in which the grazing 
resource is available to all livestock and grazing management decisions are entirely 
under the control of individual livestock owners.  This is reflected in the condition of 
the formal rangeland area.  The range is dominated by unpalatable shrub species such 
as Chrysocoma tennuifolia, which is a classic indicator of prolonged, high pressure 
grazing and poor overall condition (ARDRI, 1996).   
 
At the other management extreme is the situation with regard to the grazing of the 
arable land allocations.  According to the betterment model of land division, the 
arable lands are the exclusive property of the village, this being expressed as either 
private property (on an individual field basis) during the cropping season or 
communal property (for the entire area) during the dry season.  However, in practice 
communal grazing rights only seem to be exercised over those fields that are 
unfenced, and then only partially.  Effective institutional control over grazing of these 
communal areas is compromised by two key factors.  The first is the trespassing of 
livestock from the neighbouring township of Kayalethu onto unfenced arable fields 
during both the cropping season and the dry season.  The second is the ability of 
individuals with political weight within the village to use the somewhat ad hoc 
grazing committee to arrange for their livestock to graze these unfenced fields during 
the growing season when grazing is officially prohibited.   
 
Together, these factors undermine the credibility of the RA as an effective institution 
for the management of the arable lands as a common property grazing resource.  
Rather, they tend instead to give tacit support to the grazing committee in its capacity 
for sanctioning deviations from the traditional model at an individual level or small 
group level.  This corroborates Ainslie’s finding in nearby Peddie district that the 
existence of unofficial systems allows rural people to “…circumvent the (weak) 
statutory institutions and to pursue alternative strategies concurrently or sequentially 
to achieve their particular objectives in relation to institutions engaged in land 
management.” (Ainslie, 1998b: 8).   
 
Thus, social relations and ecological factors seem to be combining to produce what 
are essentially three different management scenarios at the two villages.  A simplified 
overview of the general process is summarised in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Framework describing how the interplay of social and ecological 
factors at the local level determines the range of grazing management systems in 
operation at Guquka and Koloni. 
 
In what might be considered the most familiar situation there is little or no 
management of the grazing resource by the community and grazing is effectively 
open-access in nature.  In truth this scenario is probably representative of the situation 
in many areas of the central Eastern Cape region.  Indeed, Cousins (1996), has 
documented conflicts over grazing rights amongst several of the villages in Sheshegu 
and Tyefu locations in the former Ciskei.  On this basis he suggests with regard to this 
area that “…most communal rangeland may even be under a form of ‘open-access’ 
rather than even ‘minimum’ common property” (Cousins, 1996: 198).  This 
‘minimum’ scenario is met when group membership rules are well defined and non-
members are excluded.  Such arrangements are often adequate when pressure on local 
resources is not excessive but are ineffective when population growth or technological 
change increase demand on local resources and an open access scenario develops 
(Lawry, 1990).  This paradigm seems to reflect what has occurred at Guquka and 
other rural areas of the former Ciskei and would suggest that the open-access grazing 
situation is a widespread phenomenon in the central Eastern Cape region.   
 
Nevertheless, it is clearly not the only management regime in operation in the region.  
In certain areas, where the ecology is suitable and appropriate social frameworks are 
in place, effective management is possible at a communal level.  This is epitomised by 
the situation in villages such as Koloni, where an appropriate (and arguably 
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fortuitous) blend of social and ecological factors have combined to create a highly 
favourable environment for communal livestock management.  However, such a case 
must be regarded as somewhat exceptional in a region generally characterised by high 
population density and limited grazing resources and this type of management regime 
cannot therefore be considered characteristic of the region as a whole.   
 
Evidence of the perpetuation of common property regimes in comparable scenarios 
elsewhere would also appear to be limited.  In other parts of the world, state 
interference in common property grazing systems, has generally resulted in 
inequitable distribution of resources, conflict between user groups and measurable 
declines in rangeland productivity (Sneath, 1998, Ostrom et al., 1999; Peters, 2004).  
In most cases however, state intervention has rarely been as extensive or systematic as 
in the communal rangelands of central Eastern Cape Province.  Perhaps the most 
comparable scenario is provided by the grazing schemes in communal areas of 
Zimbabwe, which largely parallel the imposition of betterment planning in the former 
Ciskei (Scoones, 1999).  These schemes have proved successful in situations where 
the requisite conditions for common property management have been upheld, notably 
where “….groups have come together to defend their (usually relatively well 
endowed) grazing area from encroachment by others, as well as investing in the 
improvement of the resource itself.” (Scoones, 1999: 231).  The similarity with the 
situation at Koloni is considerable and likewise underlines how adequate grazing, a 
strong sense of group identity and a willingness to invest in a valued resource can 
facilitate the existence of a functioning common property regime even in a relatively 
artificial environment of centralised planning.   
 
However, the overall verdict on these schemes is very mixed with one of their key 
failings being the inadequate attention paid to existing patterns of resource use and 
heterogeneity when the paddocks were demarcated.  This has resulted in animals 
being grazed opportunistically on pastures outside the scheme boundary during 
difficult periods such as the dry season or drought episodes (Scoones, 1999).  At 
Koloni, the need for such opportunism has been avoided only as a result of the natural 
productivity of the rangeland during the dry season combined with the availability of 
a key grazing resource in the form of the extensive arable land allocation.  This has 
been instrumental in facilitating the survival of the village common property regime.  
Here it is a situation of relative privilege at the community level, which prevents the 
creation of potential resource conflicts with neighbouring settlements.   
 
The third scenario of grazing management identified through the case studies is that of 
individual control over the grazing resource.  This is exemplified by the use of 
privately owned fenced fields at Guquka for the grazing of livestock.  Such a 
complete secession from the communal system can be regarded as inevitable in an 
environment where communal grazing resources are under huge pressure and a 
privileged minority has access to private land.  It also reinforces the view that 
historical inequality in land holdings, both within and between settlements in the 
region, underpins much of the variation in current grazing management practices.  In 
this situation the inequality is expressed in terms of the ownership of individual plots 
of arable land by a privileged minority from established families.  How representative 
this scenario is of the general situation in the region is debatable.  Certainly, this 
research is amongst the first to formally document this situation in central Eastern 
Cape Province.  However, given that similar inequalities in the allocation of arable 
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land characterise other parts of the region such as Keiskammahoek District (De Wet, 
1995) it seems likely that it is more widespread than the literature would suggest.   
 
At a broader level, the devolution of production to an individual level in communal 
areas of the former Ciskei, appears to be representative of what is taking place in 
other parts of Africa.  Indeed, the current literature connected with land tenure change 
and political economy suggests that the privatisation of land in communal areas by 
individuals or cliques is occurring throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Woodhouse et al., 
2000; Peters, 2004).  Southgate and Hulme (2000), demonstrate that paralleling the 
development of group ranches in Southern Kenya is a centralised policy of converting 
communal land into individual agricultural holdings.  These holdings have taken the 
form of both private ranches and arable farms and have mainly been appropriated by 
wealthy individuals.  However, in response to this many more marginalized people, 
such as the Maasai, have begun to illegally lay claim to land and enclose it through 
fencing.  Likewise, in Zimbabwe there is an increasing propensity for individuals to 
illegitimately annexe parts of the communal rangelands for private use by enclosing 
them with a fence (Fortmann, 1995).   
 
In both cases the spontaneous enclosure of land through fencing is broadly 
representative of what has happened in central Eastern Cape Province.  In all these 
scenarios this reaction can be considered a response to increasing levels of 
competition over available land.  However, an important difference is that in villages 
such as Guquka, people have legal title to the land they are enclosing.  In many ways 
this situation is peculiar to South Africa and the former Ciskei in particular, as the 
extended history of land ownership by Africans under secure forms of tenure is 
something that finds limited parallel in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa.  
Nevertheless, the overall effect of the enclosures is the same in all three situations - to 
deny the remainder of the population a share in what was previously a communal 
resource.   
   
Thus, the current grazing management scenario in central Eastern Cape Province 
appears to be characterised by several different systems operating on an overlapping 
and concomitant basis.  This heterogeneity can be explained through unequal patterns 
of ownership of and access to land.  Regionally, this inequality manifests itself as 
either community privilege, whereby certain settlements have considerably greater 
levels of access to land than others or individual privilege, which involves inequality 
within communities in terms of the ownership of or the ability to access grazing land 
by individuals.  Moreover, these types of inequality appear to be part of a broader 
phenomenon, which is shaping the tenure systems and negotiations surrounding 
grazing land throughout Africa (Peters, 2004).  Thus, whilst aspects of the current 
management systems identified here, such as arable enclosure may be largely unique 
within sub-Saharan Africa, the underlying causal factor is anything but.   
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CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS AT THE INSTITUTIONAL AND 
POLITICAL LEVEL 
 
These research findings are of fundamental importance to the debate on the suitability 
of common property theory as an ideological basis for policy on restructuring 
livestock production systems in communal areas.  They lend support to the arguments 
of commentators such as Ainslie, that the level of heterogeneity that exists within 
grazing systems in areas such as the former Ciskei makes the use of common property 
theory in this respect neither straightforward nor entirely desirable and that land 
reform policy should attempt to recognise this (Ainslie, 1998b).  In particular policy 
must acknowledge that whilst common property regimes do still exist in communal 
areas, albeit in often modified form, they may only be a relatively minor component 
of the property regimes currently in place (Andrew et al., 2003).  The grazing 
management scenario that exists at Koloni seems to be exceptional in areas such as 
the former Ciskei.  Rather, most systems have degenerated into a combination of 
open-access supplemented by grazing under private tenure for those livestock owners 
who have access to private land.  Thus, wholesale attempts to revitalise common 
property systems in an environment that is now largely devoid of the framework to 
support them are likely to be ineffective.  Rather, it might be better to work flexibly 
with those frameworks that are already in place.          
 
This is underlined by the debate surrounding the reform of tenure and institutions 
associated with land management.  The focus of the general debate has been on the 
creation of effective institutions controlling access to and use of communal 
rangelands.  The relatively recent introduction of the Communal Land Rights Act 
(CLRA)(DLA, 2004) has only served to intensify the debate.  Many commentators are 
dismayed by the undue emphasis the legislation places on the issuing of land titles to 
groups or individuals (Cousins, 2002) and concerned by the continuing central role of 
chiefs and traditional authorities in the new institutions associated with land 
management in communal areas (IRIN, 2003).   
 
This has considerable bearing on the research findings presented in this paper.  It is 
clear that at a statutory level, broadly similar democratic institutions (RAs) exist to 
control grazing management at both villages.  However, they function with markedly 
different levels of effectiveness.  At Koloni the RA performs well in its role of co-
ordinating grazing management at a communal level as well as in its other roles 
associated with land management.  This corroborates the point made by Ainslie 
(1998b) that local institutions need not be totally rebuilt in order to be effective.  
Importantly, the CLRA makes provision for the establishment of local administrative 
bodies, which are entirely democratically elected.   In communities such as Koloni, 
this will give formal recognition to the authority of civic bodies such as the RA in 
enforcing grazing management decisions within the community as well as legal 
recourse in the case of disputes that may arise with neighbouring communities.   
 
At Guquka the situation is less straightforward and probably more representative of 
the situation prevailing in most former homeland areas.  The simultaneous existence 
of both a statutory RA and an unofficial grazing committee weakens the jurisdiction 
of the former.  This raises the possibility of co-management or the ‘nesting’ of the 
informal institution within the statutory one in order to facilitate a more communal 
approach to management, as proposed by Lawry (1990).  The CLRA can facilitate this 
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through the democratic election of the informal actors to the local land administration 
committee.  However, there is the very real danger that this will simply result in the 
legitimisation of the existing scenario of unequal access to land by a privileged 
minority (Cousins, 2002; Peters, 2004).  In situations such as this any official 
institutions that are established are unlikely to override existing social and political 
realities, without the concomitant reform of land holdings.   
 
This brings into consideration the other important element of the CLRA, which is the 
transfer of land to groups and individuals.  Like institutional reform, this is also likely 
to have differential impacts across the former Ciskei.  In unusual cases, such as that 
exemplified by Koloni, the transfer of land envisaged by the CLRA will effectively 
formalise in law what is already taking place at a de facto level.  The communal range 
camps are already controlled and administered exclusively by the community and in 
such an environment, these changes are likely to have a positive impact on the local 
community by giving legal recognition to existing rights over access and use.  
However, in communities such as Guquka enshrining rights over communal land in 
the community itself may serve only to strengthen divisions in land access.  At present 
several communities have access to the communal grazing land including the 
township of Kayalethu, which has no formal grazing rights.  The dilemma is whether 
to formalise all existing access arrangements and risk legitimising a tragedy of the 
commons scenario, or to restrict use only to the villages of Guquka and Gilton, which 
have historical access rights and thereby give legal support to the exclusion of grazers 
from Kayalethu.  Neither of these scenarios would be realistic unless complemented 
by the provision of additional grazing land from elsewhere.   
 
The CLRA does in fact make welcome provision for land restitution or comparable 
redress where this is not possible (DLA, 2004).  Villages such as Guquka, where 
much of the upland grazing was appropriated by the state for conversion to forestry 
plantations, have a strong case for land restitution.  Without additional land the 
majority of communities in the former Ciskei will continue to face a situation in 
which land-based livelihoods continue to be the reserve of a privileged minority based 
on the enclosure of privately-owned arable plots.  Indeed, land provision must also be 
considered a pre-requisite for the effective reform and development of institutions 
associated with grazing management in communities such as Guquka.   
 
Thus, the development of a policy environment which has the capability to support 
the enormous heterogeneity of existing grazing management systems in communal 
areas of South Africa will be vital if effective agrarian development is to take place.  
The ability to respond to community needs on a case-by-case basis will depend 
ultimately on the provision of flexible policies that feed into and build on the 
management frameworks that are already in place.  Fundamental in the development 
of these policies will be an acknowledgement that in the climate of land deprivation 
and minority privilege that prevails in the former homelands, the reform of communal 
land ownership must be complemented by the provision of formal mechanisms 
through which the rural poor can gain access to additional rangeland.  
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